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Jayati Ghosh
For more than a decade now, ﬁ  nancial liberalization in developing countries has been cited as a necessary 
and signiﬁ  cant part of an economic policy package promoted by what used to be called the “Washington 
Consensus”. Typically, ﬁ  nancial sector liberalization in developing countries has been associated with 
measures that are designed to make the central bank more independent, relieve “ﬁ  nancial repression” by 
freeing interest rates and allowing ﬁ  nancial innovation, and reduce directed and subsidized credit, as well 
as allow greater freedom in terms of external ﬂ  ows of capital in various forms.
Increasingly, these policies are not imposed from outside, whether through the conditionality of 
multilateral lending institutions or bilateral pressure. Rather, policy makers, and especially those in ﬁ  nance 
ministries across the developing world, appear to have absorbed and internalized the idea that such mea-
sures are necessary to improve the functioning of the ﬁ  nancial sector generally, in terms of proﬁ  tability, 
competitiveness and intermediation, as well as to attract international capital to increase resources available 
for domestic investment. These ideas are usually supported by media, which caters to the elite in develop-
ing countries, to the extent that their constant reiteration also ensures that such measures have wide support 
among the elite and middle classes, who often have the most political voice in these countries.
Yet, the arguments in favour of ﬁ  nancial liberalization—both theoretical and empirical—are 
relatively ﬂ  imsy, and there are many grounds for scepticism regarding the claims made by the votaries 
of such measures. Indeed, there are good reasons for questioning both the extent and the pattern of the 
kind of ﬁ  nancial liberalization that is promoted. In many cases, the social and economic effects have been 
especially adverse for the poor and for farmers and workers, who have not only suffered more precarious 
conditions even during a so-called “ﬁ  nancial boom”, but two have typically also been the worst affected 
during a ﬁ  nancial crisis or the subsequent adjustment. It is also worth noting that the extreme forms of lib-
eralization are neither effective nor necessary, and that a large variety of alternative measures, as well as 
varying degrees of liberalization, is not only possible but can also be observed in several more ‘successful’ 
developing countries.
In this context, this paper examines various issues that are of immediate policy signiﬁ  cance for 
developing countries. In the ﬁ  rst section, the main elements of the standard pattern of ﬁ  nancial liberaliza-
tion that has become widely prevalent in developing countries are brieﬂ  y described. In the second section, 
I consider the theoretical arguments for and against such measures. The third section contains a discussion 
of the political economy of such measures. The fourth section identiﬁ  es the main economic and social 
effects of these measures, based on the actual experience of a number of emerging markets in the past one 
and a half decades. The ﬁ  nal section draws some policy conclusions, and presents the case that a range of 
alternative strategies is still open to policy makers in developing countries.
1  The arguments in this chapter have been deeply inﬂ  uenced by continuous discussions and collaborations with 
C.P. Chandrasekhar, Prabhat Patnaik and Abhijit Sen. I am also grateful to Jomo K. S. and the participants in the 
United Nations UN/DESA Development Forum on ‘Integrating Economic and Social Policies to Achieve the 
United Nations Development Agenda’, held at United Nations, New York, on March 14 and 15, 2005 for their 
useful insights.2  DESA Working Paper No. 4
The nature of ﬁ  nancial liberalization
Financial liberalization refers to measures directed at diluting or dismantling regulatory control over the 
institutional structures, instruments and activities of agents in different segments of the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
These measures can relate to internal or external regulations. (Chandrasekhar, 2004)
Internal ﬁ  nancial liberalization typically includes some or all of the following measures, to vary-
ing degrees:
The reduction or removal of controls on the interest rates or rates of return charged by ﬁ  nan-
cial agents. Of course, the central bank continues to inﬂ  uence or administer that rate structure 
through adjustments of its discount rate and through its own open market operations. But 
deregulation typically removes interest rate ceilings and encourages competition between 
similarly placed ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms aimed at attracting depositors on the one hand and entic-
ing potential borrowers to take on debt on the other. As a result, price competition squeezes 
spreads and forces ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms (including banks) to depend on volumes to ensure returns;
The withdrawal of the state from the activity of ﬁ  nancial intermediation with the conversion 
of the “development banks” into regular banks and the privatization of the publicly owned 
banking system, on the grounds that their presence is not conducive to the dominance of 
market signals in the allocation of capital. This is usually accompanied by the decline of 
directed credit and the removal of requirements for special credit allocations to priority sec-
tors, whether they be government, small-scale producers, agriculture or other sectors seen as 
priorities for strategic or developmental reasons;
The easing of conditions for the participation of both ﬁ  rms and investors in the stock market 
by diluting or doing away with listing conditions, by providing freedom in pricing of new is-
sues, by permitting greater freedoms to intermediaries, such as brokers, and by relaxing con-
ditions with regard to borrowing against shares and investing borrowed funds in the market;
The reduction in controls over the investments that can be undertaken by ﬁ  nancial agents and, 
speciﬁ  cally, the breaking down the “Chinese wall” between banking and non-banking activi-
ties. Most regulated ﬁ  nancial systems sought to keep separate the different segments of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector such as banking, merchant banking, the mutual fund business and insurance. 
Agents in one segment were not permitted to invest in another for fear of conﬂ  icts of interest 
that could affect business practices adversely. The removal of the regulatory walls separat-
ing these sectors leads to the emergence of “universal banks” or ﬁ  nancial supermarkets. This 
increases the interlinkages between and pyramiding of ﬁ  nancial structures;
The expansion of the sources from and instruments through which ﬁ  rms or ﬁ  nancial agents 
can access funds. This leads to the proliferation of instruments such as commercial paper and 
certiﬁ  cates of deposit issued in the domestic market and allows for offshore secondary market 
products such as ADRs (American Depository Receipts—the ﬂ  oating of primary issues in the 
United States market by ﬁ  rms not based in the United States) or GDRs (Global Depository 
Receipts);
The liberalization of the rules governing the kinds of ﬁ  nancial instruments that can be is-
sued and acquired in the system. This transforms the traditional role of the banking system’s 
being the principal intermediary bearing risks in the system. Conventionally, banks accepted 
relatively small individual liabilities of short maturities that were highly liquid and involved 
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longer maturities. The protection afforded to the banking system and the strong regulatory 
constraints thereon were meant to protect its viability given the role it played. With liberaliza-
tion, the focus shifts to that of generating ﬁ  nancial assets that transfer risks to the portfolio of 
institutions willing to hold them;
The shift to a regime of voluntary adherence to statutory guidelines with regard to capital adequa-
cy, accounting norms and related practices, with the central bank’s role being limited to supervision and 
monitoring.
External ﬁ  nancial liberalization typically involves changes in the exchange control regime. Typi-
cally, full convertibility for current-account transactions accompanying trade liberalization have been 
either prior or simultaneous reforms, which are then complemented with varying degrees of convertibility 
on the capital account. Capital-account liberalization measures broadly cover the following, in increasing 
degree of intensity, but with a wide variety of patterns of implementation:
Measures that allow foreign residents to hold domestic ﬁ  nancial assets, either in the form of 
debt or equity. This can be associated with greater freedom for domestic ﬁ  rms to undertake 
external commercial borrowing, often without government guarantee or even supervision. 
It can also involve the dilution or removal of controls on the entry of new ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, 
subject to their meeting pre-speciﬁ  ed norms with regard to capital investments. This does 
not necessarily increase competition, because it is usually associated with the freedom to 
acquire ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms for domestic and foreign players and extends to permissions provided 
to foreign institutional investors, pension funds and hedge funds to invest in equity and debt 
markets, which often triggers a process of consolidation;
Measures which allow domestic residents to hold foreign ﬁ  nancial assets. This is typically 
seen as a more drastic degree of liberalization, since it eases the possibility of capital ﬂ  ight by 
domestic residents in periods of crisis. However, a number of countries that receive “exces-
sive” capital inﬂ  ows that do not add to domestic investment in the net and are reﬂ  ected in 
unnecessary accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves, have turned to such measures as a 
means of reducing pressure on the exchange rate;
Measures that allow foreign currency assets to be freely held and traded within the domestic 
economy (the “dollarization” of accounts). This is the most extreme form of external ﬁ  nancial 
liberalization, which has been implemented only in very few countries.
The theoretical arguments for ﬁ  nancial liberalization
Underlying most of the arguments for ﬁ  nancial liberalization measures are some basic monetarist postu-
lates, namely: (i) that real economic growth is determined by the available supply of factors of production 
such as capital and labour and the rate of productivity growth, and changes in money supply do not have 
any impact on real economic activity and the growth of output; (ii) that money supply is exogenous rather 
than endogenous to the system and can be controlled by the monetary authorities, who can successfully 
pursue well-deﬁ  ned targets for monetary growth, and (iii) that inﬂ  ation is attributable to an excessive 
growth of money supply relative to an exogenously given “real rate of growth of output” and can be mod-
erated by reducing the rate of growth of money supply. These postulates can then lead to arguments for 
an “independent” central bank whose essential job would be to control inﬂ  ation by using money market 
levers to control money supply and therefore the price line.
•
•
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The basic difﬁ  culty with these arguments is now rather well known. There is no clearly discern-
ible relationship between the rates of growth of money supply and of inﬂ  ation on the one hand and real 
output growth on the other. The monetarist argument is based on the twin assumptions of full employment 
(or exogenously given aggregate supply conditions) and aggregate money supply determined exogenously 
by macro-policy. Neither of these assumptions is valid; on the contrary, there is a strong case for arguing 
that, in a world of ﬁ  nancial innovation where quasi-moneys can be created, the overall liquidity in the 
system cannot be rigidly controlled by the monetary authorities.
Rather, the actual liquidity in the system is endogenously determined. Therefore, the real mon-
etary variable in the hands of the government is the interest rate, and thus, attempts to control money 
supply typically end up as forms of interest rate policy instead. The notion of a stable “real demand for 
money” function (where the demand for money is determined by the level of real economic activity) is 
one which gets demolished by the possibility of speculative demand for money, a feature which, if any-
thing, is enhanced by ﬁ  nancial sophistication and the greater uncertainties operating in today’s economies.
Further, though the package of policies described above has evolved over time, often in response 
to the demands of increasingly omnipresent and mobile international ﬁ  nancial interests, its origins lie in 
the neoclassical notion of efﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial markets. Capital markets are seen as being competitive and 
informationally efﬁ  cient when they ensure the availability and full utilization of information required to 
determine the value of assets as well as to identify the best investments. These features ensure that the 
return that an investor expects to get from an investment would be equal to the opportunity cost of using 
the funds in some other project. To the extent that the structure of ﬁ  nancial markets—the combination of 
institutions, instruments and agents—approximates this ideal, the system is seen as being able to mobilize 
the maximum savings for investment and allocate it most efﬁ  ciently.
In addition, the need to eliminate ﬁ  nancial repression (in the McKinnon-Shaw sense) has been 
provided as a powerful argument in favour of ﬁ  nancial liberalization. Repressive policies are seen to be 
inimical to ﬁ  nancial deepening, in the context of the observed empirical relationship between ﬁ  nancial 
deepening and growth. Financial repression is said to have a depressive effect on savings rates and thereby 
to result in capital shortages and adversely affect growth. It is also argued that ﬁ  nancial repression tends 
to selectively ration out riskier projects, irrespective of their social relevance, because interest rate ceilings 
imply that adequate risk premiums cannot be charged.
But there is, of course, a large theoretical literature pointing out that ﬁ  nancial markets inher-
ently cannot be as perfect as this and, indeed, are structurally more imperfect than the markets for goods. 
Since information as a commodity has strong public good characteristics (non-rivalry in consumption and 
non-excludability in provision), this typically results in the inadequate acquisition of information even 
in apparently “competitive” markets. In ﬁ  nancial markets this means that those who manage investments 
are, therefore, inadequately monitored, which encourages inappropriate risk-taking or even fraud that 
could lead to insolvency. There are many examples of market failure in ﬁ  nancial markets resulting from 
asymmetric information, adverse selection, incentive-incompatibility and moral hazard, which are then 
aggravated because of further imperfections and the inter-linkages between ﬁ  nancial agents.2 These are, 
of course, in addition to the other more standard forms of imperfection in markets resulting, for example, 
from imperfect competition, oligopolies and increasing returns.
2  The implications of these theoretical points have been usefully summarized in Stiglitz (1993). The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Liberalization  5
There are other problems that result because social returns differ from private returns. Projects 
with high social returns may not be the ones that deliver the highest proﬁ  ts to the bank or ﬁ  nancial inves-
tor. Banks may be willing to increase their exposure to “sensitive sectors” like the stock and real estate 
markets, given the higher interest that clients are willing to pay on the expectation of larger speculative 
proﬁ  ts. Besides exposing banks to the dangers of a stock or real estate market collapse, such options 
reduce lending to investors in manufacturing or the agricultural sector who cannot accept extremely high 
interest rates. This was one of the principal reasons why governments sought to create public sector banks 
and direct public and private credit to socially important sectors.
Likewise, there are reasons to question the arguments about ﬁ  nancial repression. There are 
reasons to believe that ﬁ  nancial deepening (measured by the ratio of ﬁ  nancial to real wealth) and in-
creased ﬁ  nancial intermediation (measured by the share of ﬁ  nancial assets of ﬁ  nancial institutions in total 
ﬁ  nancial assets) need not be, in themselves, stimuli to growth, despite myriad efforts to prove that this 
is true. The existence of usurious money lending in backward agriculture, which limits rather than pro-
motes growth, is indicative of the fact that inequality of a kind inimical to growth inﬂ  uences the nature 
of a ﬁ  nancial structure. Also, evidence suggests that ﬁ  nancial crises are inevitably preceded by a phase of 
ﬁ  nancial deepening and increased intermediation.
Further, the implicit view that savings are automatically reinvested and that any increase in sav-
ings leads automatically to an increase in investment is a pre-Keynesian argument with little relevance to 
demand-constrained economies with unutilized resources. Empirical studies of savings have shown that 
there is little relationship between national savings and real interest rates. Similarly, the developmental or 
social role of banking is especially relevant when lowering interest rates can increase the quality of bor-
rowers, and it can have substantial beneﬁ  cial effects if the government is able to select the better projects 
and recipients of ﬁ  nance.
The political economy of ﬁ  nancial liberalization
The current role of international ﬁ  nance is critically related to the manner in which ﬁ  nance capital rose 
to a position of dominance in the global economy and to the role that cross-border ﬂ  ows of capital have 
been playing in the process of globalization. High rates of cross-border capital ﬂ  ows were evident during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the inter-war period, these capital movements became 
dominantly speculative in nature and were associated with very high volatility in currency markets, even 
among the industrial countries of the time. It was precisely this experience of currency instability and 
competitive devaluation that provided the impetus for the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, 
which was based on ﬁ  xed exchange rates and stringent capital controls for the ﬁ  rst two and a half decades.
The major industrial capitalist countries ﬁ  rst began relaxing controls on currency movements in 
the late 1960s, and the move to “ﬂ  oating” or ﬂ  exible exchange rates in the 1970s hastened the process. 
In that decade, there were speciﬁ  c developments outside the realm of ﬁ  nance itself that contributed to 
an increase in international liquidity, such as the surpluses generated by oil exporters after the oil price 
increases, which were largely deposited with the international banking system. This was reﬂ  ected in the 
explosion of the Eurocurrency market in the 1970s.6  DESA Working Paper No. 4
From the 1980s, there were other real factors that created pressures for the expansion of ﬁ  nance. 
These included the changing demographic structure in most of the advanced countries, with baby boom-
ers reaching an age where they were emphasizing personal savings for retirement. This was accentu-
ated by changes in the institutional structures relating to pensions, whereby in most industrial countries, 
public and private employers tended to fund less of the planned income after retirement, requiring more 
savings input from employees themselves. All this meant growing demands for more variety in the form 
of savings as well as higher returns, leading to the greater signiﬁ  cance of pension funds, mutual funds 
and the like.
Financial liberalization in the developed countries was closely related to these developments. 
However, it also contributed to the generation of savings which were in excess of investment ex ante. 
Financial liberalization in the developed countries increased the ﬂ  exibility of banking and ﬁ  nancial 
institutions when creating credit and making investments, and permitted the proliferation of institutions 
like hedge funds which, unlike the banks, were not subject to much regulation. It also encouraged “secu-
ritization”, or capital ﬂ  ows in the form of stocks and bonds, rather than loans, and “ﬁ  nancial innovation”, 
involving the creation of a range of new ﬁ  nancial instruments or derivatives such as swaps, options and 
futures, virtually autonomously created by the ﬁ  nancial system. These instruments allowed players to 
trade in the risks associated with an asset without trading the asset itself. Finally, it increased competition 
and whetted the appetite of banks to earn higher returns, thus causing them to search out new recipients 
for loans and investments in economic regions that were hitherto considered to be too risky.
Financial liberalization began with versions of the “big bang” in developed country markets. 
This was because, by the late 1960s, it became clear that old-style Keynesian policies were increasingly 
incapable of dealing with the secular deceleration that threatened most developed countries, especially the 
United States. Further, with a weakening United States economy leading to the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods arrangement and the emergence of a world of ﬂ  oating exchange rates, pursuing Keynesian-style 
policies in any one country threatened a collapse of the currency. Any effort to pump-prime the system 
generated inﬂ  ation, rendered domestic goods less competitive in world markets, widened the trade deﬁ  cit 
and weakened the currency. The collapse of old-fashioned Keynesianism was therefore also related to the 
fact that it was based on the assumption of a particular type of nation state, which was no longer valid. 
In consequence, some other means of trying to spur growth was required, and this role was played by the 
easy availability of liquidity in the “international” banking system based in the developed countries.
There followed a massive increase in international liquidity, as banks and non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions desperately searched for means to keep their capital moving, since that had become the route 
to higher proﬁ  ts in the ﬁ  nancial sector. There were booms in consumer credit and housing ﬁ  nance in the 
developed industrial nations. However, when those opportunities petered out, a number of developing 
countries were discovered as the “emerging markets” of the global ﬁ  nancial order. Capital -- in the form 
of debt and equity investments -- began to ﬂ  ow into these countries, especially those that were quick to 
liberalize rules relating to cross-border capital ﬂ  ows and regulations governing the conversion of domestic 
into foreign currency. As a result of these developments, there was a host of new ﬁ  nancial assets in emerg-
ing markets characterized by higher interest rates, ostensibly because of greater investment risks in these 
areas. The greater ‘perceived risk’ and higher returns associated with ﬁ  nancial instruments in these coun-
tries provided the basis for a whole range of new derivatives that bundled these risks and offered hedges 
against risk in different markets, each of which promised high returns.The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Liberalization  7
There are a number of features characteristic of the global ﬁ  nancial system that have evolved in 
this manner. One of the most important of current signiﬁ  cance is the growing importance of unregulated 
ﬁ  nancial agents, such as the so-called hedge funds, in the system. Although hedge funds ﬁ  rst originated 
immediately after the Second World War, they have grown in number and ﬁ  nancial strength in recent 
times. Their investors include major international banks, which are themselves forced by rules and regu-
lations to avoid risky transactions promising high returns, but which use the hedge funds as a front to 
undertake such transactions. More recently, even mutual funds and pension funds have been attracted to 
hedge funds because of the higher returns promised, and this is currently the fastest growing segment of 
the international ﬁ  nancial sector.
Second, the current global ﬁ  nancial system is obviously characterized by a high degree of cen-
tralization. With United States ﬁ  nancial institutions intermediating global capital ﬂ  ows, the investment 
decisions of a few individuals in a few institutions virtually determine the nature of the “exposure” of the 
global ﬁ  nancial system. Unfortunately, unregulated entities making huge proﬁ  ts on highly speculative 
investments are at the core of that system.
Further, once institutions that are free of the now-diluted regulatory system exist, even those that 
are more regulated become entangled in risky operations. They are entangled because they themselves have 
lent large sums in order to beneﬁ  t from the promise of larger returns from the risky investments undertaken 
by the unregulated institutions. They are also entangled because the securities on which these institutions 
bet in a speculative manner are also securities that these banks hold as “safe investments”. If changes in the 
environment force these funds to dump some of their holdings to clear claims that are made on them, the 
prices of securities the banks directly hold tend to fall, thus affecting their assets position adversely.
Entanglement takes other forms as well. With ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms betting on interest rate differentials 
and exchange-rate changes at virtually the same time, the various asset markets relating to debt, securi-
ties and currency are increasingly integrated. Crises, when they occur, do not remain conﬁ  ned to one of 
these markets but quickly spread to others, unless stalled by government intervention. Finally, the rise of 
ﬁ  nance in the manner described above feeds on itself in complex ways.
This means that there are two major consequences of the new ﬁ  nancial scenario: it is difﬁ  cult to 
judge the actual volume and risk of the exposure of individual ﬁ  nancial institutions; and within the ﬁ  nan-
cial world, there is a complex web of entanglement, where all ﬁ  rms are mutually exposed, but where each 
individual ﬁ  rm is exposed to differing degrees to particular ﬁ  nancial entities. It also makes a mockery of 
prudential norms, such as “capital adequacy” ratios, which have supposedly become more strict over time, 
since it becomes difﬁ  cult to actually deﬁ  ne or measure the extent of capital once such pyramiding of as-
sets is widely prevalent.
Further, the process of ﬁ  nancial consolidation on this base has substantially increased the risks 
associated with the system. During the 1990s, the three-decade-long process of proliferation and rise to 
dominance of ﬁ  nance in the global economy reached a new phase. The international ﬁ  nancial system was 
being transformed in ways that were substantially increasing systemic risk and rendering the system more 
crisis-prone. Central to this transformation was growing ﬁ  nancial consolidation. This has concentrated 
ﬁ  nancial activity and decision-making in a few economic organizations and also integrated areas of ﬁ  nan-
cial activity earlier separated from one another to ensure transparency and discourage unsound ﬁ  nancial 
practices.8  DESA Working Paper No. 4
The proximate explanation for the wave of ﬁ  nancial liberalization in the developing countries is 
that this pyramidal growth of ﬁ  nance, which increased the fragility of the system, was seen as an opportu-
nity. Enhanced ﬂ  ows to developing countries, initially in the form of debt and subsequently in the form of 
debt and portfolio investments, led to two consequences. First, the notion of external vulnerability which 
underlay the interventionist strategies of the 1950s and 1960s no longer seemed relevant—after all, any 
current-account deﬁ  cit could be ﬁ  nanced, it appeared, as long as such capital inﬂ  ows were assured. Sec-
ond, growth was now easier to ensure without having to confront domestic vested interests, since interna-
tional liquidity could be used not merely to ﬁ  nance current and capital expenditures but also to ease any 
supply-side constraints that would otherwise hamper such growth.
Until quite recently, the ﬁ  nancial press, the international ﬁ  nancial institutions and large sections 
of the academic community were uninhibitedly in favour of these tendencies. It was argued that this cre-
ated an opportunity for developing countries to launch on an integrationist growth strategy, since in any 
case, the sums they required were seen as a small fraction of the international liquidity being created by 
the ﬁ  nancial system. For western ﬁ  nance, emerging markets were a hedge, and for developing countries, 
international ﬁ  nance was an opportunity. A cosy relationship seemed easy to build. It appeared that all that 
was needed was the liberalization of ﬁ  nance and a monetary policy that ensured interest rates high enough 
to make capital inﬂ  ows attractive, even after adjusting for risk.
Trade and ﬁ  nancial liberalization in developing countries would not have been sustainable, even 
for short periods, had it not been for the availability of ﬂ  uid ﬁ  nance from the ﬁ  nancial centres of the world 
economy. The availability of such ﬁ  nance reﬂ  ected the rise to dominance of ﬁ  nance capital in the global 
economy, reforms protecting and privileging its interests and the consequent role that cross-border ﬂ  ows 
of capital played in the process of globalization. It also reﬂ  ected the emergence of a “ﬁ  nancial class” 
within many developing countries, which became a major lobby promoting the interests of international 
ﬁ  nance in general with respect to both ﬁ  nancial liberalization and domestic macroeconomic policies.
This virtual ﬁ  nancial explosion in developing country markets is largely explained by the factors 
encouraging ﬁ  nancial capital to move out of the developed countries. First, emerging ﬁ  nancial markets, 
though volatile, offer extremely high returns in a period when the debt overhang and slow growth in the 
developed countries has affected ﬁ  nancial interests adversely. That makes risk-discounted returns in the 
developing countries much better than in the developed. Second, privatization programs have put up for 
sale resources of substantial value that can be acquired relatively cheaply in a context of currency depre-
ciation. Third, these are markets in which the pent-up demand for credit is substantial and where innova-
tive ﬁ  nancial instruments have not been experimented with in the past. And ﬁ  nally, real interest rates, and 
therefore ﬁ  nancial sector returns, tend to be relatively high in developing countries undertaking adjust-
ment programs involving monetary stringency.
The combination of debt and portfolio capital has meant that for the last three decades, at least 
the more developed among the developing countries have found it much easier—except, of course, when 
crisis strikes—to access private foreign capital ﬂ  ows. This is taken to imply that the rise to dominance of 
ﬁ  nance and its globalizing inﬂ  uence has rendered the current-account deﬁ  cit in many developing coun-
tries less of a binding constraint.
But the boom obviously could not be consistent in all emerging markets. First, it became clear 
that none of these borrowers were in a position to meet their debt-service payments without resorting to The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Liberalization  9
further borrowing. This, together with the evidence of the colossal overexposure of the international bank-
ing system in many developing countries, set afoot the deceleration in the ﬂ  ow of liquidity that came to be 
called the ‘debt crisis’. The banks, of course, could not pull out completely, because that would have spelt 
closure for many of them, as much of developing country debt would have had to be written off rather 
than rescheduled.
But the problem went deeper, since with the rise to dominance of ﬁ  nance capital relative to in-
dustrial capital in the developed nations, the ﬁ  nancial system was awash with liquidity, but creditworthy 
borrowers were difﬁ  cult to come by in an increasingly recessionary environment. In the event, debt was 
replaced with other kinds of non-debt private capital ﬂ  ows. Here too, however, the evidence suggests that, 
barring rare exceptions, periods of accelerated capital ﬂ  ow were followed by inevitable ﬁ  nancial crises, 
when foreign investors turned wary and chose to withdraw their investments.
It is interesting to note that the enthusiasm for ﬁ  nancial liberalization, especially of capital ac-
count transactions, appears to be unabated among developing country policy makers, despite all the 
evidence of greater frequency and intensity of crises in emerging markets. Indeed, the acceptance of 
capital-account liberalization continues, even though research from very mainstream quarters, including 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), increasingly suggests that ﬁ  nancial liberalization plays little role 
in increasing the investment rates of developing countries and exposes countries to many undesirable risks 
of volatility, deﬂ  ation and crisis.3
In many countries, ﬁ  nancial reforms are seen, even now, as the most essential and urgent of the 
“second-generation reforms” that typically follow upon the “ﬁ  rst-generation reforms” such as trade lib-
eralization, privatization of a range of public activities and internal deregulation of various markets. It is 
also clearly the case that the pressures for ﬁ  nancial liberalization do not come only from external agen-
cies; rather, there are internal pressures generating from the economic requirements of domestic capital, 
the interests of local elites and the emergence of domestic “ﬁ  nancial classes” as described above.
The negative effects of ﬁ  nancial liberalization
There are some signiﬁ  cant negative economic and social effects of ﬁ  nancial liberalization, which are often 
so large that they signiﬁ  cantly outweigh any beneﬁ  ts in terms of access to more capital inﬂ  ows. These 
relate both to ﬁ  nancial markets and to the real economy. Essentially, ﬁ  nancial liberalization creates expo-
sure to the following kinds of risk: a propensity to ﬁ  nancial crises, both external and internal; a deﬂ  ation-
ary impact on real economic activity and reduced access to funds for small-scale producers, both urban 
and rural. This in turn has major social effects in terms of loss of employment and more volatile material 
conditions for most citizens.
Financial fragility and the propensity to crisis
It is now widely accepted that ﬁ  nancial liberalization has resulted in an increase in ﬁ  nancial fragility in 
developing countries, making them prone to periodic ﬁ  nancial and currency crises. These relate both to 
internal banking and related crises, and currency crises stemming from more open capital accounts. The 
3  See, for example, Prasad and others (2003), Feldstein (ed.) (2003).10  DESA Working Paper No. 4
origin of several crises can be traced to the shift to a more liberal and open ﬁ  nancial regime, since this 
unleashes a dynamic that pushes the ﬁ  nancial system towards a poorly regulated, oligopolistic structure, 
with a corresponding increase in fragility. Greater freedom to invest, including in sensitive sectors such as 
real estate and stock markets, ability to increase exposure to particular sectors and individual clients and 
increased regulatory forbearance all lead to increased instances of ﬁ  nancial failure. In addition, as men-
tioned earlier, the emergence of universal banks or ﬁ  nancial supermarkets increases both the degree of 
entanglement of different agents within the ﬁ  nancial system and the domino effects of individual ﬁ  nancial 
failures.
Financial markets, left to themselves, are known to be prone to failure because of the public 
goods characteristics of information which agents must acquire and process. They are characterized by 
insufﬁ  cient monitoring by market participants. Individual shareholders tend to refrain from investing 
money and time in acquiring information about management hoping that others will do so instead and 
knowing that all shareholders, including themselves, beneﬁ  t from the information garnered. As a result, 
there may be inadequate monitoring leading to risky decisions and malpractice. Financial ﬁ  rms wanting 
to reduce or avoid monitoring costs may just follow other, possibly larger, ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms in making their 
investments, leading to what has been observed as the “herd instinct” characteristic of ﬁ  nancial players. 
This not merely limits access to ﬁ  nance for some agents, but could lead to overlending to some entities, 
the failure of which could have systemic effects. The prevalence of informational externalities can create 
other problems. Malpractice in a particular bank leading to failure may trigger fears among depositors in 
other banks, resulting in a run on deposits there.
Disruptions may also occur because expected private returns differ from social returns in many 
activities. This could result in a situation where the market undertakes unnecessary risks in search of 
high returns. Typical examples are lending for investments in stocks or real estate. Loans to these sectors 
can be at extremely high interest rates because the returns in these sectors are extremely volatile and can 
touch extremely high levels. Since banks accept real estate or securities as collateral, borrowing to ﬁ  nance 
speculative investments in stock or real estate can spiral. This type of activity thrives because of the belief 
that losses, if any, can be transferred to the lender through default, and lenders are conﬁ  dent of govern-
ment support in case of a crisis. This could feed a speculative spiral that can in time lead to a collapse of 
the bubble and bank failures.
Meanwhile, all too often the expected microeconomic efﬁ  ciency gains are not realized. Even in 
the United States, bond markets play a limited role and equity markets virtually no role at all in ﬁ  nancing 
corporate investment in these countries. The stock market is primarily a site to exchange risks rather than 
raise capital for investment. In developing countries, too, the new issues market is small or non-existent 
except in periods of a speculative boom, and bank lending post-liberalization privileges risky high-return 
investment rather than investment in the commodity-producing sectors like manufacturing and agriculture. 
The effects on those sectors of liberalization are indirect, as they are realized through the demand-generat-
ing effects of housing and personal ﬁ  nance booms, which in many circumstances also tend to increase the 
fragility of the system.
Another result of ﬁ  nancial liberalization in imperfect markets is the strengthening of oligopolistic 
power through the association of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and non-ﬁ  nancial corporations. Financial inter-
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group; this is by no means a more efﬁ  cient means of allocation than could have occurred under directed-
credit policies of the government.
Moreover, while ﬁ  nancial liberalization does encourage new kinds of ﬁ  nancial savings, total 
domestic savings typically do not increase in many cases, and expansion of available ﬁ  nancial savings is 
often the result of and inﬂ  ow of foreign capital. With deposits and loans of less than six months’ duration 
dominating, liberalization does not necessarily result in intermediation of ﬁ  nancial assets with long-term 
maturities either. And despite short booms in stock markets, there tends to be relatively little mobilization 
of new capital or capital for new ventures. In fact, small investors tend to withdraw from markets because 
of allegations of manipulation and fraud, and erstwhile areas of long-term investments supported by state 
intervention tend to disappear. Not surprisingly, investment performance does not usually reﬂ  ect signs of 
improved volume or more efﬁ  cient allocation either.
External ﬁ  nancial liberalization, with associated capital inﬂ  ows, only aggravates these conse-
quences. Indeed, all the evidence on capital inﬂ  ows and subsequent crises suggests that once an emerging 
market is “chosen” by ﬁ  nancial markets as an attractive destination, processes are set in motion which 
are eventually likely to culminate in crisis. This works through the effects of a surge of capital inﬂ  ows on 
exchange rates (unless the capital does not add to an increase in domestic investment but simply ends up 
adding to reserves).
An appreciating real exchange rate encourages investment in non-tradable sectors, the most obvi-
ous being real estate, and in domestic asset markets generally. At the same time, the upward movement of 
the currency discourages investment in tradables and therefore contributes to a process of relative decline 
in real economic sectors, and even deindustrialization in developing countries. Given the differential in 
interest rates between domestic and international markets and the lack of any prudence on the part of in-
ternational lenders and investors, local agents borrow heavily abroad to directly or indirectly invest in the 
property and stock markets.
Thus, it was no accident that all of the emerging market economies experiencing substantial 
ﬁ  nancial capital inﬂ  ows also experienced property and real estate booms, as well as stock market booms, 
around the same time, even while the real economy may have been stagnating or even declining. These 
booms, in turn, generated the incomes to keep domestic demand and growth in certain sectors growing at 
relatively high rates. This soon resulted in signs of macroeconomic imbalance, not in the form of rising 
government ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits, but as a current-account deﬁ  cit reﬂ  ecting the consequences of debt-ﬁ  nanced 
private proﬂ  igacy.
However, once there is growing exposure in the form of a substantial presence of internationally 
mobile ﬁ  nance capital, any factor that spells an economic setback, however small or transient, can trigger 
an outﬂ  ow of capital as well. And the current-account deﬁ  cits that are necessarily associated with capi-
tal-account surpluses (unless there is large reserve accumulation) eventually create a pattern whereby the 
trend becomes perceived as an unsustainable one, in which any factor, even the most minor or apparently 
irrelevant one, can trigger a crisis of sudden outﬂ  ows.
One very common conclusion that has been constantly repeated since the start of the Asian crisis 
in mid-1997 is the importance of “sound” macroeconomic policies once ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows have been liberal-
ized. It has been suggested that many emerging markets have faced problems because they allowed their 12  DESA Working Paper No. 4
current-account deﬁ  cits to become too large, reﬂ  ecting too great an excess of private domestic investment 
over private savings. This belated realization is a change from the earlier obsession with government ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cits as the only macroeconomic imbalance worth caring about, but it still misses the basic point.
This point is that, with completely unbridled capital ﬂ  ows, it is no longer possible for a country to 
control the amount of capital inﬂ  ow or outﬂ  ow, and both movements can create consequences which are 
undesirable. If, for example, a country is suddenly chosen as a preferred site for foreign portfolio invest-
ment, it can lead to huge inﬂ  ows which in turn cause the currency to appreciate, thus encouraging invest-
ment in non-tradables rather than tradables, and altering domestic relative prices and, therefore, incen-
tives. Simultaneously, unless the inﬂ  ows of capital are simply (and wastefully) stored up in the form of 
accumulated foreign-exchange reserves, they must necessarily be associated with current-account deﬁ  cits.
Large current deﬁ  cits are therefore necessary by-products of the surge in capital inﬂ  ow, and that is 
the basic macroeconomic problem. This means that any country which does not exercise some sort of con-
trol or moderation over private capital inﬂ  ows can be subject to very similar pressures. These then create 
the conditions for their own eventual reversal, when the current-account deﬁ  cits are suddenly perceived 
to be too large or unsustainable. In other words, what all this means is that, once there are completely free 
capital ﬂ  ows and completely open access to external borrowing by private domestic agents, there can be 
no “prudent” macroeconomic policy; the overall domestic balances or imbalances will change according 
to the behaviour of capital ﬂ  ows, which will themselves respond to the economic dynamics that they have 
set into motion.
This points to the futility of believing that capital-account convertibility accompanied by domes-
tic prudential regulation will ensure against such boom-bust volatility in capital markets. With completely 
unbridled capital ﬂ  ows, it is no longer possible for a country to control the amount of capital inﬂ  ow or 
outﬂ  ow, and both movements can create consequences that are undesirable. Financial liberalization and 
the behaviour of ﬂ  uid ﬁ  nance have therefore created a new problem which is analogous to the old “Dutch 
disease”, with capital inﬂ  ows causing an appreciation of the real exchange rate that causes changes in the 
real economy and therefore generates a process that is inherently unsustainable over time.
Deﬂ  ation and developmental effects
The most forceful critique of ﬁ  nancial liberalization relates not only to the enhanced possibility of crises, 
but to the argument that it has a clear bias towards deﬂ  ationary macroeconomic policies and forces the 
state to adopt a deﬂ  ationary stance to appease ﬁ  nancial interests. (Patnaik, 2003) To begin with, the need 
to attract internationally mobile capital means that there are limits to the possibilities of enhancing taxa-
tion, especially on capital. Typically, prior or simultaneous trade liberalization has already reduced the 
indirect tax revenues of states undertaking ﬁ  nancial liberalization, and so tax-GDP ratios often deteriorate 
in the wake of such liberalization. This then imposes limits on government spending, since ﬁ  nance capital 
is generally opposed to large ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits. This not only affects the possibilities for countercyclical 
macroeconomic stances of the state but also reduces the developmental or growth-oriented activities of the 
government.
Financial interests are against deﬁ  cit-ﬁ  nanced spending by the state for a number of reasons. 
To start with, deﬁ  cit ﬁ  nancing is seen to increase the liquidity overhang in the system, and is therefore 
viewed as being potentially inﬂ  ationary. Inﬂ  ation is anathema to ﬁ  nance since it erodes the real value The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Liberalization  13
of ﬁ  nancial assets. Second, since government spending is “autonomous” in character, the use of debt to 
ﬁ  nance such autonomous spending is seen as introducing into ﬁ  nancial markets an arbitrary player not 
driven by the proﬁ  t motive, whose activities can render interest rate differentials that determine ﬁ  nancial 
proﬁ  ts more unpredictable. If deﬁ  cit spending leads to a substantial build-up of the state’s debt and inter-
est burden, it is possible that the government may intervene in ﬁ  nancial markets to lower interest rates 
with implications for ﬁ  nancial returns. Financial interests wanting to guard against that possibility tend 
to oppose deﬁ  cit spending. Finally, since ﬁ  nancial interests privilege the role of markets, the presence of 
the state as regulator and the interventionist activity of the state can be seen as de-legitimizing the role of 
ﬁ  nance, which is another reason why ﬁ  nancial markets tend to prefer the reduction and control of govern-
ment deﬁ  cits.
These tendencies affect real investment in two ways. First, if speculative bubbles lead to ﬁ  nan-
cial crises, they squeeze liquidity and increase costs for current transactions and result in distress sales of 
assets and deﬂ  ation that adversely impact on employment and living standards. Second, inasmuch as the 
maximum returns to productive investment in agriculture and manufacturing are limited, there is a limit 
to what borrowers would be willing to pay to ﬁ  nance such investment. Thus, despite the fact that social 
returns to agricultural and manufacturing investment are higher than those for stocks and real estate, and 
despite the contribution that such investment can make to growth and poverty alleviation, credit at the 
required rate may not be available.
This is why it is increasingly recognized that liberalization can dismantle the very ﬁ  nancial struc-
tures that are crucial for economic growth. While the relationship between ﬁ  nancial structure, ﬁ  nancial 
growth and overall economic development is complex, the basic issue of ﬁ  nancing for development is 
really a question of mobilizing or creating real resources. In the old development literature, ﬁ  nance in 
the sense of money or ﬁ  nancial assets came into play only when looking at the ability of the state to tax 
away a part of the surplus to ﬁ  nance its development expenditures, and at the obstacles to deﬁ  cit-ﬁ  nanced 
spending, given the possible inﬂ  ationary consequences if real constraints to growth were not overcome. 
By and large, the ﬁ  nancial sector was seen as adjusting to the requirements of the real sector.
In the brave new world, however, when the ﬁ  nancial sector is increasingly left unregulated or 
covered by a minimum of regulation, market signals determine the allocation of investible resources and 
therefore the demand for and the allocation of savings intermediated by ﬁ  nancial enterprises. This can 
result in the problems conventionally associated with a situation where private rather than overall social 
returns determine the allocation of savings and investment. It aggravates the inherent tendency in markets 
to direct credit to non-priority and import-intensive but more proﬁ  table sectors, to concentrate invest-
ible funds in the hands of a few large players and to direct savings to already well-developed centres of 
economic activity.
The socially desirable role of ﬁ  nancial intermediation therefore becomes muted. This certainly 
affects employment-intensive sectors such as agriculture and small-scale enterprises, where the transac-
tion costs of lending tend to be high, the risks many and collateral not easy to ensure. The agrarian crisis 
in most parts of the developing world is at least partly, and often substantially, related to the decline in 
the access of peasant farmers to institutional ﬁ  nance, which is the direct result of ﬁ  nancial liberalization. 
Measures which have reduced directed credit towards farmers and small producers have contributed to ris-
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have reduced the economic viability of cultivation, thereby adding directly to rural distress. In India, for 
example, there is strong evidence that the deep crisis of the cultivating community, which has been associ-
ated with a proliferation of farmers’ suicides and other evidence of distress such as mass migrations and 
even hunger deaths in different parts of rural India, has been related to the decline of institutional credit, 
which has forced farmers to turn to private moneylenders and involved them once more in interlinked 
transactions to their substantial detriment.
It also has a negative impact on any medium-term strategy for ensuring growth in particular sec-
tors through directed credit, which had been the basis for the industrialization process through much of 
the twentieth century. In the past, in a large number of developing countries, the ﬁ  nancial structure had 
been developed keeping in mind its developmental instrumentality. Financial structures were therefore 
created to deal with the difﬁ  culties associated with late industrial entry: capital requirements for entry in 
most areas were high, because technology for factory production had evolved in a capital-intensive direc-
tion from its primitive industrial revolution level; competition from established producers meant that ﬁ  rms 
had to concentrate on production for a protected domestic market or be supported with ﬁ  nance to survive 
long periods of low-capacity utilization during which they could ﬁ  nd themselves a foothold in world 
markets.
Not surprisingly, therefore, most late industrializing countries created strongly regulated and even 
predominantly state-controlled ﬁ  nancial markets aimed at mobilizing savings and using the intermediary 
function to inﬂ  uence the size and structure of investment. This they did through directed credit policies 
and differential interest rates, and the provision of investment support to the nascent industrial class in the 
form of equity, credit and low interest rates.
By dismantling these structures, ﬁ  nancial liberalization destroys an important instrument that 
historically evolved in late industrializers to deal with the difﬁ  culties of ensuring growth through the 
diversiﬁ  cation of production structures that international inequality generates. This implies that ﬁ  nancial 
liberalization is likely to have depressing effects on growth through means other than just the deﬂ  ationary 
bias it introduces into countries opting for such liberalization.
This is all the more signiﬁ  cant because the process of ﬁ  nancial liberalization across the globe has 
not generated greater net ﬂ  ows of capital into the developing world, as was expected by its proponents. 
Rather, for the past several years, the net outﬂ  ows have been in the reverse direction. Even the emerg-
ing markets, which have been substantial recipients of capital inﬂ  ows, have not experienced increases in 
aggregate investment rates as a consequence, but have built up their external reserves. This is only partly 
because of precautionary measures to guard against possible ﬁ  nancial crises; it also indicates a macroeco-
nomic situation of ex ante excess of savings over investment resulting from a deﬂ  ationary macroeconomic 
stance. For example, East and South Asia together received US$186 billion of capital inﬂ  ows in 2003, but 
added to their foreign-exchange reserves to the tune of US$245 billion in the same year!
The curious workings of international ﬁ  nancial markets have contributed to international concen-
tration, whereby developing countries (particularly those in Asia) hold their reserves in US Treasury bills 
and other safe securities, and thus contribute to the fact that the United States economy currently absorbs 
more than two thirds of the world’s savings. At the same time, developing countries are losing in ﬁ  nancial 
terms because of the costs of holding these reserves since, typically, the reserves are invested in very low-
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This inverse and undesirable form of ﬁ  nancial intermediation is, in fact, a direct result of the ﬁ  nancial 
liberalization measures that have simultaneously created deﬂ  ationary impulses and increased ﬁ  nancial 
fragility across the developing world.
Alternative strategies for developing country ﬁ  nancial systems
It is evident from this discussion that complete ﬁ  nancial liberalization—in the sense of implementing all 
of the various internal and external measures described here, is neither necessary nor desirable. In fact, 
such extreme measures have not been implemented by the more successful developing country industrial-
izers. In fact, the examples of those countries that have successfully industrialized—from the nineteenth 
century onwards, and continuing to date—is instructive, because there are two features which are com-
mon to all of them: some degree (usually substantial) of directed credit; and some controls on cross-bor-
der capital ﬂ  ows.
The role played by directed credit in countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea is well 
known, but it was in fact also a crucial element of the industrialization strategy in nineteenth-century Ger-
many and in the early twentieth-century United States, among others.4 Control over the allocation of bank 
credit continues to be one of the most signiﬁ  cant ways in which the Chinese Government is able to control 
both the level and distribution of economic activity in the ongoing phase of rapid economic growth.
Similarly, capital controls of various sorts have been very important in allowing the economic 
space required for industrializing countries to inﬂ  uence domestic investment and reduce unintended vola-
tility in markets. It is true that trade controls and the encouragement of a degree of import substitution has 
also been very necessary for late industrializers, and that too is something which is much more possible 
and likely when the capital account is also controlled.
The typical response to this among policy makers is that all this may be historically true, but the 
world has changed and such strategies are no longer possible because the forces of globalization and the 
new international regimes have dramatically restricted the scope for autonomous national policies. The 
most common argument today is that developing countries simply have no choice but to follow the path of 
greater external economic integration and ﬁ  nancial liberalization.
However, this is not really true, as is evident even from the actual practices being followed in 
different parts of the developing world, which do not get adequate publicity. In particular, with respect 
to the capital account of the balance of payments, there is a wide range of possibilities and methods of 
regulation or direction of capital ﬂ  ows. There is already a large set of controls which have been used quite 
recently (and continue to be used in some countries) which provide good examples.5 Capital controls of 
varying sorts have been used to effect in recent times by countries ranging from Chile and Colombia to 
Taiwan Province of China and Singapore.
There are the more obvious direct controls which regulate the actual volume of inﬂ  ow or outﬂ  ow 
in quantitative terms. These can relate to foreign direct investment (FDI) and to external borrowing by 
residents as well as to portfolio capital ﬂ  ows. In addition, these can be directed within the economy to-
wards particular sectors or recipients through positive or negative lists. But there are also more indirect or 
4  Summary accounts of these experiences are provided in Reinert (ed.) (2004) and Chang (2002).
5  Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2004) outline various strategies already used by different developing countries. 16  DESA Working Paper No. 4
market-based methods which have been increasingly used to regulate capital movements. Several coun-
tries have speciﬁ  ed a minimum residence requirement (of one to three years) on portfolio capital inﬂ  ows 
and also on FDI. Chile and Colombia had provided for a non-interest bearing reserve requirement (of 
between 33 per cent to as much as 48 per cent of the total inﬂ  ow) to be held for one year with the central 
bank to ensure that the inﬂ  ows were not of a speculative nature.
For portfolio capital, other speciﬁ  c measures are possible. In some countries, foreigners are pre-
vented from purchasing domestic debt instruments and corporate equity. The extent of foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI) penetration in the domestic stock market can be regulated, with a limit on the proportion 
of stocks held by such foreign investors. Exit levies can be imposed that are inversely proportional to the 
length of the stay, meaning that capital which leaves the country sooner is subject to a higher tax. In any 
case, differential rates of taxation provide an important means of regulating capital ﬂ  ows and can be ﬂ  ex-
ibly adjusted to suit different conditions and changing circumstances.
In the case of external commercial borrowing, some countries have imposed a tax on foreign 
loans. Others have provided ﬁ  scal incentives for domestic borrowing and investment. Domestic banking 
regulations can also play an important role in ensuring that private external debt does not reach undesir-
able proportions and in directing resources towards particular sectors.
The international ﬁ  nancial press tends to portray such controls as rigid and as acting as disin-
centives to investment. But the reality is very different—experience shows that these controls can be, 
and have been, used ﬂ  exibly and altered in response to changing circumstances. Furthermore, they have 
typically not acted as a disincentive to continued capital inﬂ  ows of the desired variety; instead, they have 
ensured that such inﬂ  ows actually contribute to increasing investment in socially effective ways. It is 
worth noting that China, which still retains the largest number and most comprehensive of controls over 
all forms of capital ﬂ  ow among all countries, has also been the largest recipient of capital inﬂ  ows in the 
developing world.
Some capital control measures may be required not only to prevent crises and excessive changes 
in the exchange rate, which render the economy externally uncompetitive, but also to enable the continu-
ation of domestic ﬁ  nancial policies that promote sustainable industrialization. It should now be obvious 
that some role for directed credit is essential not only to ensure a sustained industrialization strategy but 
also in order to ensure that the goals of employment generation and social equity are met.
Similarly, controls over domestic ﬁ  nancial activity and the regulatory role of the central bank 
need to be emphasized in order to prevent domestic ﬁ  nancial crises and excessive cyclical volatility. 
Prudential controls of the kind promoted by the Bank for International Settlements are not the obvious 
solution, since they tend to be pro-cyclical in their effects, are too greatly determined by the context and 
requirements of developed countries and are insufﬁ  ciently ﬂ  exible for developing countries (Grifﬁ  th-
Jones and Ocampo, 2004).
So, there is a strong case for developing countries to ensure that their own ﬁ  nancial systems 
are adequately regulated with respect to their own speciﬁ  c requirements, which may vary substantially, 
depending upon the size and nature of their economies, the extent of external integration, the relative 
importance of the banking system vis-à-vis the capital market, and so on. All this means that blindly fol-
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successful developing country industrializers have been those who have adopted much more unique and 
controlled ﬁ  nancial regimes.
One pervasive myth that deserves to be shattered is that greater international trade exposure and 
trade dependence necessarily require greater ﬁ  nancial integration and both internal and external ﬁ  nancial 
liberalization. In fact, the most successful trading economies of the recent past have been those which 
have relatively more controlled ﬁ  nancial systems. China is, of course, the best example, where a major 
export boom and rapid trade dependence have been associated with a ﬁ  nancial system which allows the 
government not only to systematically channel credit in desired areas, but also to use this as a major 
macroeconomic instrument for demand management and smoothing business cycles. The rapid expansion 
of Chinese enterprise does not appear to have been inhibited by such controlled credit, even in the pe-
riod when mainland Chinese entrepreneurs could not directly access bank credit; neither has the growing 
integration of China with the world economy been hampered by the absence of any capital market worth 
the name. In fact, future economic historians may even ﬁ  nd that such controlled credit was an important 
factor behind the rapid export-led industrialization drive.
Finally, it is worth considering the argument that more controlled ﬁ  nancial systems encourage 
opacity, corruption and “crony capitalism”, all of which are not only wasteful of resources but can lay the 
grounds for subsequent crises. This is the view of those who have, for example, blamed the East Asian 
ﬁ  nancial crises of the late 1990s on such ﬁ  nancial control-based “crony capitalism”. It is, of course, no 
one’s case that corruption is either desirable or even acceptable; however, it should nevertheless be noted 
that high levels of “corruption” and “crony capitalism” have had little effect on reducing the level of per 
capita income or retarding the rate of economic growth, as the experience of countries as far aﬁ  eld as 
Japan and the United States makes amply clear.
Further, the real solution for such problems is to encourage greater openness about the direction 
of ﬁ  nance and to increase public accountability of such ﬁ  nancial transactions, rather than leave socially 
important decisions of resource allocation to the workings of private ﬁ  nancial markets that are neither 
accountable nor transparent and that, in any case, are prone to various types of market failure. While 
corruption is an ever-present danger, it is so under all ﬁ  nancial systems, the most deregulated and market-
determined ones. Financial liberalization in the name of reducing corruption therefore does not reduce 
the possibility or likelihood of corruption, while it exposes the economy to myriad risks and reduces the 
capacity of the state to promote autonomous and sustainable development.
Clearly, therefore, if the development project is to continue at all in large parts of the world where 
it remains essentially partial and incomplete, some government control over the ﬁ  nancial sector remains 
essential. This, in turn, means that strategies that are only concerned with the “sequencing” of liberaliza-
tion measures are asking the wrong question. The real question should be: Which ﬁ  nancial controls should 
be maintained, restored or introduced in order to ensure a viable, stable and socially desired pattern of 
development?18  DESA Working Paper No. 4
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